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II. FURTHER STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The graveman of this appeal is whether the language used by the District Court judge in his 
pre-trial order was sufficient to put plaintiffs on notice that the judge expected and required plaintiffs 
to disclose foundational facts for admissibility of expert opinions and conclusions concurrent with 
the expert witness disclosure deadline. If the pre-trial order did not provide sufficient notice, then 
the District Court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiffs' expert witnesses from testifying in 
this matter and effectively dismissing plaintiffs' case. 
Even if this Court finds that the District Court's pre-trial order did provide sufficient and 
meaningful notice, then this Court must further determine whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in failing to consider lesser sanctions. This Court would also need to determine whether 
the District Court abused its discretion by failing to consider the personal circumstances of plaintiffs' 
counsel and whether those circumstances provided good cause to excuse plaintiffs' failure to disclose 
foundational facts as ultimately required by the District Court. Lastly, if this Court believes the pre-
trial order provided plaintiffs with meaningful notice, the District Court nevertheless erred in failing 
to consider the expert witnesses' supplemental opinions and foundation generated through discovery 
and permitted pursuant to Rule 26( e )(1 )(B). 
III. FURTHER ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
A. The District Court's discretion will be scrutinized more closely when the first sanction 
issued is a dismissal. 
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"A District Court has authority to sanction parties for non-compliance with pre-trial orders, 1 
and sanctions may include those enumerated in I.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(B), (C) and (D) for discovery 
violations." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 872, 136 P.3d 338, 343 (2006); I.R.C.P. 16(i). 
However, before a District Court resorts to the drastic remedy of a dismissal, "a District Court must 
consider lesser sanctions, and if dismissal is nevertheless ordered, appropriate findings of fact must 
be made. Southern Idaho Production Credit Ass 'n v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 531, 746 P.2d 985, 
990 ( 1987). Notwithstanding the District Judge's discretion in entering an order for sanctions, ''when 
examining the first sanction order, if it is a dismissal, an appellate court will scrutinize it much more 
closely than it will a lesser sanction." Id. 113 Idaho at 532, 746 P.2d at 991 (Donaldson, J. specially 
concurring.)[Emphasis added.] To properly enter an order effectively dismissing the case as a first 
sanction, "the trial judge must make detailed findings as to why a lesser alternative is not proper." 
Id. [Emphasis added.] 
B. Plaintiffs were not provided meaningful notice of the District Court's expectations with 
respect to the scope and extent of reguired expert witness disclosures as contained in 
the District Court's Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial. 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the language of the District Court's Order and 
Notice Setting Jury Trial provided meaningful notice to the plaintiffs of the District Court's 
expectations concerning the scope of expert witness disclosures . See R. at 89. In its entirety, the 
District Court's pre-trial order pertaining to the plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure reads: 
1 Of necessity, for the District Court to determine that there has been non-complaince with a pre-trial order, the 
pre-trial order must unambiguously identify the information required to be disclosed. Plaintiffs assert that the pre-trial 
order in this case was ambiguous and vague and, as such, failed to provide meaningful notice to plaintiffs of the District 
Court's expectations concerning expert witness disclosures. AB is argued in Section B of this Reply Brief, the District 
Court's failure is to clearly state its pre-trial expectations and requirements deprived the plaintiffs of notice and due 
process. 
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Plaintiff(s) expert witness disclosure, including opinions and 
conclusions must be filed at least 100 days before trial. 
R. at 892• No further explanation, clarification or directive was provided by the Court in its pre-trial 
order. The pre-trial order was devoid of any reference to I.R.C.P. 26(b), or to Idaho Code §§6-1012 
or 6-1013. When the parties stipulated to amend the pre-trial order to shorten the time for plaintiffs' 
expert disclosures, the substance of the pre-trial order did not change. See R. at 93B. There was 
nothing in the written pre-trial order, original or as amended, that gave plaintiffs meaningful notice 
as to the District Court's unarticulated but broad interpretation of the phrase "opinions and 
conclusions" to communicate that foundational facts were expected to be disclosed. 
Even though defendants/respondents repeatedly argue in their briefs that the phrase "opinions 
and conclusions" communicated the court's expectation that foundational facts were to be disclosed, 
their respective briefs filed in this matter belie that contention. The defendants consistently add a 
parenthetical and/or additional clarifying statements after referring to the phrase, "opinions and 
conclusions" in an attempt to describe for this Court how defendants have interpreted the phrase 
"opinions and conclusions."3 See Marano Respondent's Brief at pp. 15, 18, 26, 30; and EIRMC 
2 The pre-trial order and pre-trial process is intended to allow the District Court to efficiently manage cases, 
to give the District Court a managerial role in the trial process and to supervise the pre-trial phase oflitigation. See Fish 
Haven Resort, Inc., v. Arnold, 121 Idaho 118,121,822 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Ct. App. 1991),Edmundsv. Kraner, 142 Idaho 
867, 875, 136 P.3d 338,346 (2006), Millerv. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1985). In this case the District 
Court apparently believed that "efficient management of this case" would only require plaintiffs' expert witness 
disclosures I 00 days before trial, or by December 2, 2013. This point is important when examining "prejudice" to the 
defendants and fashioning appropriate sanctions when the District Court concluded that plaintiffs' expert witness 
disclosures were deficient. 
3 In Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006) the Supreme Court stated that a pre-trial order 
requiring only the name of the expert was insufficent to put a plaintiff on notice that full compliance with the foundational 
statutes was required at the time of disclosure. In dicta, the Supreme Court implied that a trial judge could craft a more 
detailed pre-trial order so as to require such information at the time of disclosure. Id. Here, Defendant EIRMC goes as 
far to say that the Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial was a "much more detailed pre-trial order," implying that the 
plaintiffs should have divined the District Court's intent. Plaintiffs dispute that the words "opinions and conclusions" 
were sufficient to provide notice of the specific scope of the District Court's disclosure expectations, especially when 
Plaintiffs' counsel regularly receives pre-trial orders from other judges within the Seventh Judicial District which are 
much more detailed in their language. See R. at 642-643. 
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Respondent's Brief at pp. 3, 13, 15, 26, 28. 
If the District Court had added a similar explanation or parenthetical to its pre-trial order, the 
ambiguity and confusion arising from this phrase would have been avoided. Respondents' repeated 
parentheticals to provide their own interpretation of the phrase points up the lack of clarity in the 
wording used by the District Court. 
Even the District Judge seemed uncertain of the precise scope and intent of his pre-trial 
order. During oral argument on defendants' respective Motions in Limine, the court referring to the 
expert disclosure requirement, stated: 
Well, I'm not sure the [pre-trial] order requires everything; 
but I think it does require a prima facie showing. 
Hearing Transcript p. 16, 11. 1 7-19 [Emphasis added.] Now here in the pre-trial order was there any 
suggestion that plaintiffs' expert disclosures had to rise to the level of presenting a prima facie 
showing! 
As to the District Judge's intent upon announcing the exclusion of plaintiffs' experts, the 
judge stated: 
That testimony is not relevant, it's not going to be allowed, 
and the testimony is precluded. So does that mean that they 
can't be rehabilitated? I don't know . ... I know I've left it 
somewhat indefinite. But I don't know. I don't think I can 
shut the door on this case at this point in time .... 
Id. p. 25 11. 19-22, p. 26 11. 18-20.[Emphasis added.] Addressing the effective dismissal of the case 
upon excluding plaintiffs' experts, the judge further remarked: 
[I]t's a pretty drastic consequence to say that these witnesses are 
precluded without recourse, yeah. That a pretty drastic 
consequence ... I simply don't feel like I can preclude that at this 
point in time. 
Id. p. 2811. 1-3, 16-21 [Emphasis added.] 
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Despite these sentiments, the District Court excluded the plaintiffs' expert witnesses, thereby 
effectively terminating plaintiffs' case. 
The judge's written order of December 3, 2013, stated that the "disclosures as to these expert 
witnesses do not include the elements required by LC.§ 6-1012, i.e. knowledge of the local standard 
of care." R. at 188-189. Of course, the pre-trial order did not mention the need to disclose the LC. 
§6-1012 foundational facts. The District Judge's confusion between the wording of his pre-trial 
order and his subjective expectations was highlighted by his statement that "Plaintiffs' duty to 
disclose included the duty to disclose all testimony which would establish the witness' competency 
to testify.',4 Id. [Emphasis in original.] 
After plaintiffs sought reconsideration and/or an extension of time to comply with the District 
.court's disclosure expectations, the District Court again conceded that the pre-trial order lacked 
clarity. In its Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Extension of Time, Etc. (December 5, 2013), 
the District Court stated that "Plaintiffs are correct in noting that the scheduling order did not 
specifically reference the statutory burden of proof set out in I.C. § 6-1012 or§ 6-2013[sic][.]" 
R. at 205. Although the trial judge expressed his belief that Plaintiffs should have provided the 
foundational facts without a specific directive to do so, the court acknowledged that Edmunds v. 
Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 874-75, 136 P.3d338, 345-46 (2006) "likely stands from the proposition that 
a District Court should allow some latitude when there is an issue of non-compliance with a 
scheduling order that does not specifically identify what is to be disclosed." Id. [Emphasis added.] 
More specifically, during oral argument the trial judge indicated that: 
4 The District Court confuses the requirements of disclosure of opinions and conclusions with admissibility. At 
the time of disclosure, there was nothing in the pre-trial order placing plaintiffs on notice that they were to disclose all 
information to make their experts' opinions admissible. Moreover, there was no Motion for Summary Judgment pending 
to put the admissibility of the expert's opinions at issue. The pre-trial order did not require plaintiffs to disclose "all 
testimony" of the experts but rather "opinions and conclusions." See R. at 89. 
9 - APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Edmunds kind of makes the suggestion that the judge, if the 
judge is going to require disclosure, maybe the judge ought to 
indicate that the statute's part of the required disclosure. I 
mean, it's kind of suggested in Edmunds. 
Hearing Transcript p. 48, 11. 11-14.[Emphasis added.] 
At this point in the proceedings, the court recognized that defendants still had "sufficient time 
to respond to Plaintiffs' supplemental disclosure, and allowances as to discovery and further motions 
[ would] largely alleviate the possible prejudice [ to defendants]" and therefore permitted the plaintiffs 
to make supplemental disclosures, and allowing Plaintiffs fourteen (14) days to do so. R. at 206. 
It was only after the December 3, 2013 and December 4, 2013 hearings, and receiving the 
District Judge's orders of December 3, 2013 and December 5, 2013 that the Plaintiffs' finally had 
meaningful notice of the intended scope of the District Court's desired expert witness disclosures. 
Perhaps it was put best during oral argument on December 3, 201 when plaintiffs' counsel informed 
the District Court that it had finally "made it clear how you interpret your pre-trial order." Hearing 
Transcript p. 26, 11. 12-13. Plaintiffs produced complying disclosures within the 14 day extension 
given by the District Court's December 5, 2013 Order. 
C. The "twenty day period" within which to raise an objection to expert witness 
disclosures did not relate to objections with respect to admissibility/foundation. 
Defendants believe that the directive in the pre-trial order that a "failure to object to any 
expert witness disclosure within twenty days of the required disclosure shall be deemed a waiver of 
objection" (R. at 89), justified the court's sanction in this matter and superseded the need for the pre-
trial order to provide meaningful notice with respect to the scope and nature of the required 
disclosures. This is simply not the case. If anything, this "objection" requirement adds further 
mystery and obscurity to the pre-trial order, rendering the order even more ill-defined. 
If the "objection" requirement carries any significance, it certainly could not be related 
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to the admissibility of an expert witness' testimony. Idaho case law is clear that admissibility, 
especially in medical malpractice actions, is a threshold evidentiary matter to be determined by the 
court at the time admissibility is put at issue. See Edmunds v. Kramer, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 
(2006); Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 45 P.3d 816 (2002). This 
foundational requirement is not a matter that can be ''waived" by a defendant by failing to raise an 
objection. Presumably ( although admittedly unclear), the District Court's "objection" requirement 
was geared toward objections concerning an expert's professional qualifications, situations where 
the expert was not trained in the same discipline or area of practice as the defendant medical 
professional, or any other objection concerning the substance of an expert's opinions. 
The fallacy of the defendants' argument is evident upon examining the consequences and 
result if the defendants' had failed to object. Based on the defendants' interpretation, had the 
defendants' failed to object to the plaintiffs' expert witness disclosures, all objections concerning 
admissibility of expert opinions would have been waived and their testimony allowed at trial 
without any foundation proffered. This Court would not countenance such a practice or uphold such 
a "waiver" in a medical malpractice trial if the experts did not first satisfy the statutory factual 
foundation requirements ofI.C. §6-1012 and §6-1013. To allow such "case management"by a pre-
trial order would be contrary to fair play and notions of substantial justice. 
If defendants' perception of the District Court's pre-trial order "waiver" penalty is 
accurate, and had defendants not objected and instead immediately filed for summary judgment, 
plaintiffs, rather than providing by way of affidavit any facts required by LC. §6-1012 to form the 
foundation of their expert witnesses' testimony could have instead asserted a ''waiver" by the defense 
and avoided summary judgment without presenting any admissible expert witness testimony! 
Likewise, if the matter were to continue to trial and plaintiffs' experts lacked a factual foundation 
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for admissibility their testimony, to defendants' rationale, would require the District Court to bypass 
foundation requirements and allow the expert's testimony because the "objection" would have been 
waived by operation of the pre-trial order. Both of these scenarios lead to ridiculous results. 
One can only wonder and guess what the District Court intended through this "objection" 
requirement. Regardless of the District Court's intent or purpose, the fact that the defendants felt 
compelled to object does not excuse the District Court for failing to give plaintiffs meaningful notice 
as to its expectations and the scope of the expert witness disclosures the District Court wanted. 
D. After being provided with actual notice of the District Court's expectations with 
respect to the scope of Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosures, Plaintiffs supplemental 
disclosures fully complied and the disclosures were timely filed within the 14 day 
extension. 
By granting the Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time as set forth in the District 
Court's December 5, 2013 order, the District Court cured (albeit temporarily) the problem created 
by its prior failure to provide meaningful notice of the scope ofits pre-trial order. See R. at 206. With 
the District Court's clarification ofits expectations, the Plaintiffs understood, for the first time, that 
"opinions and conclusions" now required disclosure of the all the foundational facts required by LC. 
§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 as well as information required by LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A). Relative to plaintiffs' 
experts, the District Court instructed plaintiffs to specifically disclose: 
R. at 206. 
(1) whether they are familiar with the local standard of care, and 
if so, how they became familiar with the local standard of care, 
and (2) if not familiar with the local standard of care, the basis by 
which their testimony would otherwise be admissible under Idaho 
law. 
In response, plaintiffs timely filed supplemental disclosures as invited by the District 
Court and which satisfied the District Court's clarified expectation. R. at 224-271, 27 5-597, 601-616. 
The substance of these disclosures were never evaluated by the District Court because the District 
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Court reversed itself and recanted on its extension of time, concluding without significant analysis 
or elaboration that the court had made a "mistake." R. at 769. 
Notwithstanding the inherent logic of the District Court's December 5, 2013 Order5, 
which acknowledged that any potential prejudice to defendants could be alleviated through 
adjustment of disclosure dates and/or an extension of discovery, (R. at 206), the court reversed its 
position completely in its January 14, 2014 Order on Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, (R. at 767-
770) and summarily excluded plaintiffs' experts. The District Court's reasoning in its January 14, 
2014 Order is, however, inconsistent with the Record and demonstrates an abuse of discretion in 
recanting and withdrawing the extension previously afforded to plaintiffs. 
1. Plaintiffs were candid with the District Court concerning the need to develop 
and disclose their expert witnesses' foundational facts. The District Court did 
not make a "mistake" when it granted Plaintiffs a 14 day extension to 
supplement their disclosures. 
In withdrawing the extension of time within which to supplement disclosures, the District 
Court intimated that the initial extension of time given to plaintiffs was simply to allow plaintiffs 
to furnish the foundational information that they already possessed but had "inadvertently failed" to 
disclose. See R. at 768. Specifically, the January 14, 2014 Order states: 
Through various statement made at the time of the objection 
hearing [the] Court believed that the defective disclosure was 
perhaps due to inadvertence in disclosing how the experts became 
familiar with the standard of care .... In review, it is now clear 
that this was not a situation where there was an inadvertent failure 
in disclosing how the expert witnesses were familiar with the 
local standard of care ... As such, as of the time disclosures were 
due ... Plaintiffs' experts had still not familiarized themselves 
5 As noted above, the District Court originally contemplated that an efficient progression of discovery and pre-
trial litigation would be accomplished by plaintiffs' disclosing expert "opinions and conclusions" by December 2, 2013. 
Even considering the 14 day extension, plaintiffs filed their supplemental disclosures on December 18, 2013, only 16 
days after the original disclosure date. It is hard to believe that if the court had envisioned December 2, 2013 as an 
appropriate disclosure date that a 16 day delay would cause irreparable prejudice to defendants. 
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with the local standard of care. 
R. at 768. This statement is in direct conflict with the District Court's Order of December 5, 2013 
where, and the explicit acknowledgment that the plaintiffs' experts may not be familiar with the local 
standard of care6• The January 14, 2014 Order is inconsistent with the District Court's earlier 
position and Order. In the January 14, 2014 Order, the District Court acknowledges that "this Court 
should not have granted additional time for Plaintiffs to try to acquaint witnesses Delong and Arruda 
with the applicable local standard o(care. R. at 769 [Emphasis added.] 
Plaintiffs were, however, transparent concerning their expert witnesses' struggle to 
confirm the local standard of care. During oral argument on December 3, 2013 plaintiffs' counsel 
informed the trial judge: 
This isn't a hide the ball. This isn't a contest of cat and mouse. 
We're willing to tell them. But to cut us off at this point on a very 
hypercritical interpretation of the Court's scheduling order that 
doesn't refer to Rule 26(b) just is wrong. It is, in fact, a discovery 
matter. And if they want to meet and confer, we'll do that. But we 
can't do that until we have all the evidence in and available for 
the experts. 
Hearing Transcript pp. 18-19, II. 23-25, 1-4. [Emphasis added.] Even assuming that the District 
Court may have misinterpreted counsel's comments above, Mr. Nalder made it abundantly clear on 
December 4, 2013 during oral argument on plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider/Extension ofTime that 
plaintiffs' experts were still in the process of obtaining the foundational facts regarding familiarity 
with the local standard and informed the court: 
6 The December 5, 2013 order directed supplemental disclosures concerning, "(1) whether the experts are 
familiar with the local standard of care, and if so, how they became familiar with the local standard of care, and (2) if 
not familiar with the local standard of care, the basis by which their testimony would otherwise be admissible under 
Idaho law." R. at 206. [Emphasis added.] How the District Court could state on January 14, 2014 that it believed the lack 
of disclosure was an inadvertent failure when it explicitly contemplated this on December 5, 2013 is perplexing at best, 
and at worst, contrived. 
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As a matter of fact, both of our experts were formulating -
that is DeLong and Arruda have been formulating that 
information and are currently doing that. That's why I believe 
we can provide that information within the next 10 days .... 
. (W]e hadn't fully developed that aspect of the testimony. In 
all candor to the Court, I've got to tell you that. ... One of the 
difficulties, frankly, that we encounter, which shouldn't be 
news to anyone here, is trying to get a neurosurgeon to consult 
with Dr. DeLong. That's a substantial problem, and we're 
trying to deal with that issue presently. 
Hearing Transcript p. 37, IL 21-25, p. 38, IL 16-18, p. 39, IL 14-18. [Emphasis added.] 
There is little doubt that by the conclusion of the December 4, 2013 hearing, the District 
Court clearly understood that the plaintiffs' expert witnesses had not, but were still in the process 
of familiarizing themselves with the local standard of practice. This position is accurately reflected 
by the District Court's December 5, 2013 Order and the judge's discussion concerning both the 
granting of an extension of time to plaintiffs as well as detailing the minimal prejudice that an 
extension would cause the defendants. For the District Court to take a position on January 14, 2014 
so diametrically in opposition to its December 5, 2013 Order defies explanation. Indeed, there was 
no reasonable, articulated explanation from the District Court.· 
2. Plaintiffs did not seek an extension of time within which to disclose their expert 
witnesses because Plaintiffs believed their disclosures were adequate. 
By January 14, 2014 the District Judge had apparently forgotten that he had adopted the 
Plaintiffs' argument that the pre-trial order did not provide meaningful notice with respect to the 
scope of the expert disclosures expected by the District Court. Instead of continuing to follow the 
guidance of Edmunds v. Kraner and the District Judge's own reasoning it its December 5, 2013 
Order, the District Court summarily determined that had made a "mistake" and that there was no 
good cause to grant the extension that had already been afforded to and relied upon by Plaintiffs. R. 
at 769. Perhaps most perplexing was the District Judge's conclusion that "any further supplemental 
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disclosures would be untimely'' (Id.) because the December 5, 2013 order that had extended the 
deadline for plaintiffs' supplemental disclosures to December 19, 2013 was being rescinded. R. at 
206. At the time the plaintiffs had filed their supplemental disclosures, those disclosures were 
unquestionably "timely'' according to the then-controlling December 5, 2013 Order. 
The defendants and the District Court are critical that plaintiffs did not seek an extension 
of the expert disclosure deadline before the disclosure deadline occurred, and that plaintiffs' counsel 
failed to disclose their personal circumstances before the plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure date 
had passed. These arguments are nonsensical and completely ignore that plaintiffs made a good faith 
effort to comply with the disclosure requirement as it was understood by plaintiffs' counsel at the 
original disclosure deadline. Why would plaintiffs' counsel ask for an extension and/or inform the 
District Court of their personal or familial circumstances and health issues when plaintiffs believed 
that their expert witness disclosures complied with the pre-trial order? Such an argument is nothing 
more than a "red herring" and an attempt to distract this Court from the original disconnect between 
the actual language of the pre-trial order and the District Court's unwritten expectations. 
With the clear understanding given by the District Court at the December 3, 2013 hearing, 
the plaintiffs were preparing to meet the demands and expectations of the District Court's newly-
revealed disclosure expectations. At that same hearing, plaintiffs requested a ten (10) day extension 
to comply with these new disclosure requirements. In doing so, plaintiffs' counsel allowed the 
District Court and the defendants to know of some of the more personal circumstances and medical 
health issues facing the plaintiffs' counsel in an effort to provide the District Court with additional 
understanding as to why plaintiffs' counsel might not have accurately interpreted the language of the 
District Court's pre-trial order. There was never an attempt at gamesmanship but a true 
misunderstanding based on the imprecise language of the District Court's pre-trial order. Plaintiffs 
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believed that their October 30, 2013 expert witness disclosures sufficiently met the District Court's 
pre-trial requirement. It is nonsensical that plaintiffs would have sought an extension prior to this 
time based on this belief. 
E. The District Court's inconsistent rulings and Orders blur the lines between 
"disclosures" and "testimony" and further evidence the disconnect between the 
District Court's expectations and the pre-trial order as written. 
It is undisputed that the District Court's pre-trial order failed completely to reference 
Idaho Code § § 6-1012 or 6-1013 or LR. C.P. 26(b ). Instead, the pre-trial order asked only for 
disclosure of the expert witnesses and their "opinions and conclusions." R. at 89. The pre-trial order 
provided no notice that the "admissibility'' of the expert's opinions would be or could be challenged 
immediately upon disclosure. Unfortunately, through the District Court's "back and forth" and 
inconsistent orders, this is exactly what has happened. As the discovery process was ongoing, 
plaintiffs understood the purpose of the pre-trial disclosures was to alert the defendants to the 
existence of the plaintiffs' experts and the substance of their opinions. Nothing more. Plaintiffs 
understood that defendant's would investigate and conduct discovery and depositions to ferret out 
the foundational facts to determine admissibility of the opinions and conclusions.7 
The District Court clearly read into its pre-trial order an admissibility requirement. Once 
again, plaintiffs were not given meaningful notice that the District Court would be conducting an 
admissibility test at the time of the initial expert disclosures, especially where the admissibility of 
the experts' opinions had not been put at issue through either a motion for summary judgment or a 
motion to compel discovery. Plaintiffs' disclosures were a good faith attempt to inform defendants 
7 At the time the District Court allowed plaintiffs fourteen (14) additional days to file supplemental disclosures, 
the District Court acknowledged that any prejudice to defendants would be largely alleviated. R. at 206. At that time, 
the District Court sanctioned plaintiffs by allowing defendants to depose plaintiffs' experts with respect to their 
supplemental disclosures at the Plaintiffs' expense. R. at 206. [Emphasis added.] 
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of the identity of their expert witnesses and the substance of their opinions. "It has long been held 
that Fifth Amendment due process protections apply to protect claimants from the unjust imposition 
of sanctions given for failure to comply with pre-trial orders, where such claimants have made a 
good faith effort to comply." Southern Idaho Production Credit Ass 'n v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 
534, 746 P.2d 985, 993 (1987)(Huntley, J., concurring specially), citing Societe Internationale, Etc. 
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,209, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1094, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958). 
Unfortunately, and even though the pre-trial expressly required disclosure of only 
"opinions and conclusions," the District Court transformed or interpreted this duty as an unwritten 
requirement to "disclose all testimony which would establish the witness' competency to testify." 
R. at 189. [Emphasis in original.] It is unclear how, without notice to the plaintiffs, the "disclosure" 
obligation was transformed to a "testimony" or "admissibility'' obligation. Did the District Court 
expect the disclosures to be in the form of an affidavit or sworn statement so as to make the 
disclosures admissible testimony and sufficient to survive summary judgment even though 
defendants had never filed for summary judgment?8 The District Judge's expert disclosure 
expectations became a "moving target" and there was no way the Plaintiffs were able to ascertain 
the District Court's expectation through the plain language of the written pre-trial order. 
1. The District Court explicitly gave permission to supplement the disclosures on 
December 5, 2013. 
Recognizing the discrepancy between the District Court's expert witness disclosure 
8 I.R.C.P. 56 is the controlling procedural Rule concerning summary judgment. During the summary judgment 
process, the parties are encouraged/directed to file affidavits (i.e., admissible testimony) to either support or oppose the 
summary judgment. Procedurally, when summary judgment is sought, the admissibility of the expert opinions is "placed 
at issue" for the first time. This is why plaintiffs contend the District Court abused its discretion in ordering, then granting 
summary judgment in favor of defendants without considering the testimony (not disclosures) of plaintiffs' experts ( Dr. 
DeLong and Nurse Arruda) which were filed in opposition to Summary Judgment. There is no dispute that by the time 
admissibility was placed at issue through the summary judgment process the plaintiffs' experts had demonstrated the 
necessary foundation to make their testimony admissible. 
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expectation and the plaintiffs' reasonable interpretation of the language of the pre-trial order, and 
given that a minimal extension would not cause significant prejudice to defendants, the court granted 
plaintiffs a fourteen (14) day extension to supplement their expert witness disclosures. See R. at 206. 
Specifically the court sought supplemental disclosures with respect to: 
(1) whether [the experts] are familiar with the local standard 
of care, and if so, how they became familiar with the local 
standard of care, and (2) if not familiar with the local standard 
of care, the basis by which their testimony would otherwise be 
admissible under Idaho law. 
R. at 206. By this Order, the District Court extended the plaintiffs' disclosure date to December 19, 
2013. During this extension, plaintiffs timely disclosed the information necessary to comply with 
the District Court's newly-clarified expert witness disclosure expectations. Plaintiffs disclosed 
information concerning Nurse Arruda's consultation with a local nurse to confirm Arruda's 
familiarization with the local standard of care.9 R. at 224-233. With respect to Dr. DeLong, his 
supplemental disclosure, supported by the affidavit of counsel, demonstrated that Dr. DeLong's 
testimony would be admissible under Idaho common law because the "local standard" was 
indeterminable due to the local and state-wide unwillingness of any neurosurgeon or other qualified 
doctor to consult with Dr. DeLong10• R. at 224-225, 234-271, 275-616. 
9 Defendant EIRMC talces exception to Nurse Anuda's consultation with the local nurse, Susan Dicus, RN, 
DNP, claiming that Ms. Dicus is a newly disclosed witness. However, Ms. Dicus is not a testifying expert, but a 
consulting witness, not subject to the disclosure requirements in any event. See Bybee v. Gorman, 2014 WL 4656517 
(2014) (an expert witness' testimony does not categorically fail the foundational requirements where the consultant is 
anonymous). Even if Ms Dicus was considered a "new" expert, the District Court had specifically given plaintiffs the 
permission to file supplemental disclosures with such information. 
10 Plaintiffs also submitted the Affidavit of John Henry Schneider, Jr. M.D. evidencing his consultation with 
Dr. DeLong. Dr. Schneider maintains a practice in Billings, Montana, a community similar to Idaho Falls. Although not 
required by statute, Plaintiffs filed Dr. Schneider's Affidavit to provide further foundation for Dr. DeLong's testimony. 
According to I. C. § 6-1012, "If there be no other like provider in the community and the standard of practice is therefore 
indeterminable, evidence of such standard in similar Idaho communities at said time may be considered." [Emphasis 
added.] The statute does not mandate comparison to a similar Idaho community. Regardless, plaintiffs sought 
consultation with all neurosurgeons in the state ofldaho, only to have such efforts ignored or rebuffed. 
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Defendants incorrectly assert that plaintiffs' additional disclosures, which were expressly 
permitted by the District Court's December 5, 2013 Order, constitute impermissible supplementation 
including "new witnesses" and "new opinions." In support of their position, defendant's rely on the 
federal court case of Paugh v. Ottman, 2008 WL 2704561. This case is not believed to be a reported 
decision. 11 However, in Paugh the plaintiff was attempting supplementation under Rule 26( e )(1 ), 
not under an express directive by the District Court permitting the supplementation concerning the 
expert's familiarization with the local standard of care. Therefore, Paugh is distinguishable from, 
and inapplicable to, this matter. 
The District Court in this case acknowledged on December 5, 2013 that the pre-trial order 
had failed to give plaintiffs meaningful notice with respect to the scope of the required disclosures; 
namely, that the District Court expected disclosure of the foundational facts to establish the 
admissibility of the experts' testimony, even though this was never stated in the written pre-trial 
order. Because plaintiffs were not given notice of this expectation, the December 5, 2013 order 
expressly provided for the plaintiffs an opportunity for supplementation 12 • R. at 206. Paugh simply 
is not applicable to this case. The plaintiffs supplemental disclosures conformed to the court's then-
controlling order in any event. The District Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the 
supplemental disclosures and concluded that the disclosures were untimely, even though the District 
Court had expressly invited such supplemental disclosures. 
11 It is unclear from the decision in Paugh how the pre-trial/scheduling order was worded, or what notice it gave 
plaintiffs with respect to the scope of disclosures required at the disclosure deadline. Because Paugh dealt with a 
discovery supplementation issue and not a court authorized disclosure supplementation, it is inapplicable to this appeal. 
12 That the District Court ultimately recanted and withdrew the disclosure extension does not change the fact 
that, at the time the disclosures were made, the disclosures conformed to the District Court's then controlling order. By 
recanting, the District Court, without any permissible justification, returned plaintiffs to the position ofbeing sanctioned 
for allegedly failing complying with a pre-trial order that the court had already acknowledged did not adequately state 
the scope of the expected expert witness disclosures. 
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F. The District Court abused its discretion when it imposed a sanction which was the 
eguivalent to a dismissal of Plaintiff's claims without making detailed fmdings as 
to why a lesser sanction was not proper. 
In a medical malpractice action, for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case at trial or 
on summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer expert testimony that the defendant health care 
provider negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice. See Rhodehouse 
v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P .2d 1224 (1994). Therefore, any sanction excluding a plaintiff's 
experts in a medical malpractice action is a "death sentence" for a plaintiff's case; such a sanction 
is in effect a dismissal of the case. Here, the District Court acknowledged that exclusion of plaintiffs' 
expert witnesses would be dispositive of the case when the court invited defendants to file for 
summary judgment based on the record, without the need for a hearing, and without considering any 
affidavits of plaintiffs' experts or their consulting experts. R. at 770. 
According to Justice Donaldson's specially concurring opinion in Southern Idaho 
Production CreditAss'n v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526,531, 746 P.2d 985,990 (1987): 
Sanctions serve a dual purpose. They can be used to punish 
misconduct and deter others involved in litigation to prevent 
abuse in connection with discovery. It is also equally true that 
sanction can be used to encourage and aid in discovery. At 
first blush, these twin aims may seem in conflict, but in reality 
are congruent. The trial judge should use the sanction power 
wisely and ultimately try to achieve the efficient 
administration of justice. He should not consider one aim 
more important than the other aim, but generally he should try 
to attempt to satisfy the aim of encouragement before 
applying the more drastic punishment sanction. 
[Emphasis added; Internal citations omitted.] 
Judge Donaldson continued: 
As noted by Wright & Miller regarding the use of sanction power 
in federal courts, " ... [I]t seems especially fitting that courts should 
make the punishment fit the crime and should not impose a 
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drastic sanction that will prevent adjudication of a case on its 
merits except on the clearest showing that this course is required 
... . The courts have ... exercised their discretion in a fashion 
intended to encourage discovery rather than simply to punish for 
failure to make discovery." 
Id. Quoting 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2284, pp. 767-72. (Footnotes 
omitted.)[Emphasis added.] 
In Southern Idaho Production Credit Ass 'n v. Astorquia, the majority held that "before 
ordering the drastic remedy of dismissal of [claims], a District Court must consider lesser 
sanctions, and that if dismissal is nevertheless ordered, appropriate findings of fact must be 
made." See Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399,401 (5th Cir.1985)(District Court 
must explain why lesser sanctions would be inadequate). Id. 113 Idaho at 531, 746 P.2d at 990. 
[Emphasis added.] Stated differently, to uphold on appeal a dismissal as a first sanction, the trial 
judge must have made detailed findings as to why a lesser alternative sanction is not proper. 
Id. 113 Idaho at 532, 746 P.2d at 991 (Donaldson, J, concurring). 
Here, the District Court did not make specific findings as to why lesser sanctions were 
not appropriate, and in fact, had already entered lesser sanctions, which the court then withdrew 
when it reconsidered its prior order. It then entered Summary Judgment in favor of the defendants 
without considering the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs of their experts. See R. at 206. This is 
reversible error. 
1. The District Court initially entered lesser sanctions which addressed any 
potential prejudice to defendants, but then without explanation turned away 
from such sanctions and excluded plaintiffs' expert witnesses; a sanction 
equivalent to dismissal. 
It is unknown what caused the District Court to retreat from its initial observation that 
excluding plaintiffs' experts (the equivalent of a dismissal) was a "pretty drastic" consequence with 
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little prejudice to defendants. (See Hearing Transcript p. 28; R. 206), to enter its subsequent order 
excluding plaintiffs' expert witnesses, and to then enter summary judgment in defendants' favor 
without further discussion or consideration of the affidavits or evidence proffered by plaintiffs. R. 
at 767-771, 1203-1209. In early December 2013, the court was unable to articulate any unfair 
prejudice to the defendants in granting to plaintiffs additional time to make supplemental disclosures 
concerning the foundational facts supporting their expert's testimony. In particular, the court stated: 
R. at 205-206. 
Generally, any late or delayed disclosure of testimony or 
evidence may be prejudicial to the opposing party. However, 
in considering the trial date in this matter, the Court cannot 
conclude that a supplemental disclosure at this time should be 
precluded. Notwithstanding some prejudice to defendants, it 
is the Court's opinion that there is sufficient time to respond 
to Plaintiffs' supplemental disclosure, and allowances as to 
discovery and further motions will largely alleviate the 
possible prejudice. 
In addition, the court sanctioned the plaintiffs by ordering that: 
R. at 206. 13 
To the extent Defendants determine there is a need to depose 
Arruda and/or Delong as to the new information provided in the 
supplemental disclosures, such depositions may be taken at 
Plaintiffs' expense. The Court will also allow additional time for 
Defendants to conduct discovery or disclose rebuttal testimony as 
may be necessary in responding to the supplemental disclosures. 
13 Although dealt with within a discussion about whether supplementation is "seasonable" the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 875, 136 P.3d 338, 346 (2006) stated that one test to determine if a 
supplementation is seasonable is whether the opposing party is "given the opportunity for full cross examination? If 'yes,' 
then there would be no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony." Id. In Edmunds the court noted that the 
supplementation was seasonable because there was ample time to undertake additional discovery and the defendant had 
not disposed the plaintiff's expert witness. Here, in weighing prejudice, the same analysis applies. The defendants were 
not prejudiced by the delay and/or allowance for supplemental disclosures because they were afforded time to conduct 
discovery and neither defendant had taken the deposition of either of the plaintiffs' experts. In fact, the District Court 
expressly indicated it would allow extra time for discovery if needed, and ordered that plaintiffs cover the cost of 
deposition. 
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At that point, the trial was more than three (3) months away and had never been 
continued. The discovery period was still open and all parties were afforded time to continue 
discovery on all matters. Ultimately, the District Court, presumably in an effort to alleviate any 
additional interim cost to defendants, entered orders suspending defendants' disclosure deadlines. 
R. at 772, 794. It is plaintiffs' belief that such sanctions and discovery accommodations more than 
alleviated any prejudice to the defendants. In fact, during oral argument, defendants were unable to 
articulate any prejudice except for the costs which the defendants would incur in disclosing 
defendants' experts and in taking depositions. See Hearing Transcript p. 28, IL 4-15. There is no 
indication that the District Court even considered a continuance of the trial date as an intermediate 
sanction short of dismissal. 
Based on the directive of the December 5, 2013 Order, Plaintiffs filed the necessary 
supplemental disclosures and were prepared to adjust to the discovery changes and defendants' new 
disclosure deadlines as the District Court had directed. The defendants moved to have the court 
reconsider its prior decision granting plaintiffs additional time for supplementing their disclosures. 
Ruling in favor of defendants' Motion to Reconsider, the court without explanation reversed its prior 
decision and extension of time for plaintiffs to supplement, and excluded plaintiffs' experts. 
Noticeably absent from the District Court's Order on Defendants' Motion to Reconsider (R. 767-
770) is any discussion concerning the prejudice to defendants or how the prejudice may have 
changed since the December 5, 2013 Order. Noticeably absent from the Order on Defendants' 
Motion to Reconsider is any mention of the prior accommodations ( additional time for discovery and 
disclosures) and sanctions (plaintiffs to pay the cost of depositions) already imposed by the court. 
Noticeably absent from the Order on Defendants' Motion to Reconsider is any discussion as to why 
the court believed the previously ordered accommodations and sanctions that would "largely 
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alleviate the possible prejudice" to defendants on December 5, 2013 (R. at 206) had somehow 
become inadequate by January 14, 2014. Noticeably absent from the Order on Defendants' Motion 
for Reconsideration is any specific finding or discussion of whether alternative and lesser sanctions 
short of dismissal would have been insufficient or inadequate. 
What is clear from the Order on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration is the District 
Court's acknowledgment that the order excluding plaintiffs' expert witnesses was dispositive of the 
case and a gateway for the defendants' to file a motion for summary judgment, (i.e., that the Order 
was, in effect, a dismissal of plaintiffs' claims). R. at 770. 
The District Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider lesser sanctions and/or 
retreated completely from its prior conclusion that any possible prejudice to defendants would be 
largely alleviated through minor accommodations and lesser sanctions against plaintiffs. The District 
Court further abused its discretion by failing to make specific findings of fact when it entered its 
order excluding plaintiffs' experts, effectuating a dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. 
G. Even if the District Court correctly concluded that plaintiffs' expert witness 
disclosures were deficient, Nurse Arruda's testimony as supplemented pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l}, which was based on EIRMC's internal policies disclosed in 
discovery, formed an independent basis upon which Nurse Arruda's testimony was 
admissible. The District Court abused its discretion by completely ignoring Rule 
26(e)(l}. 
"Idaho law specifically contemplates that expert testimony can change after the initial 
disclosure." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,874, 136 P.3d 338,345 (2006). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(l)(B), 
unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to supplement 
responses to discovery with respect to the substance and 
subject matter of an expert's testimony where the initial 
responses have been rejected, modified, expanded upon or 
otherwise altered in some manner. 
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Id. Citing Clark v. Klien, 137 Idaho 154, 157, 45 P.3d 810, 813 (2002)(quoting Radmer v. Ford 
Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86,813 P.2d 897 (1991)). [Emphasis by the Court in Edmunds.] According 
to Rule 26( e )( 1 )(B) a party is under a "duty to seasonably supplement" information concerning that 
party's expert witnesses. In Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 Idaho 205, 213, 846 P.2d 207, 215 
(1992)(Bakes, C.J., concurring) Justice Bakes noted: 
[ A ]n important inquiry in determining whether a response was 
given 'seasonably' is: was the opposing party given an 
opportunity for full cross examination? If 'yes,' then there 
probably would be no abuse of discretion in admitting the 
testimony. 
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 875, 136 P.3d at 346, quoting Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 
Idaho at 213,846 P.2d at 215 (Bakes, C.J., concurring). 
In Edmunds, the Supreme Court concluded that the supplementation of the expert witness 
disclosures was 'seasonable' because there was still time to undertake additional discovery and the 
defendant had not yet deposed the expert witness. Id. Here, the District Court completely ignored 
Rule 26(e)(l)(B). In recanting its order allowing plaintiffs extension of time to supplement 
disclosures, the District Court stated, "[t]o allow additional time was a mistake. There was no good 
cause to do so, any further supplementation would be untimely, and the allowance of additional time 
defeats the original purpose of the scheduling order." R. at 769 [Emphasis added.] Further 
demonstrating a disregard ofRule 26( e )(1 )(B), the District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants and stated, "where the focus is on the time for [sic] the original disclosures, 
subsequent disclosures or testimony by affidavit should not be considered." R. at 1208 [Emphasis 
added.] The District Court's understanding of Rule 26(e)(l)(B) was misguided, and the 
supplementation of Nurse Arruda's testimony was disregarded even though her supplemented 
testimony was based on additional discovery responses produced by defendant EIRMC in the regular 
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course of discovery and during the discovery period set by the District Court's pre-trial order. 14 
Had the District Court properly applied Rule 26(e)(l)(B) Nurse Arruda's admissible 
opinions with respect to the negligent conduct of defendant EIRMC would have defeated summary 
judgment. The District Court acknowledged Arruda' s qualifications when it stated, "that Arruda may 
now have an opinion on the local standard of care does not remedy the initial failure in not timely 
disclosing her testimony with the required element of the local standard of care." R. at 1205 
[Emphasis in original.] Even if this Court were to conclude that plaintiffs had meaningful notice of 
the disclosure expectations through the District Court's pre-trial order, it was an abuse of discretion 
for the District Court to simply ignore Rule 26( e )(1 )(B) and ignore Nurse Arruda' s opinions based 
on the plaintiffs' timely discovery, including Arruda's foundation for such opinions which were 
based on the discovery responses of EIRMC. 15 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This appeal turns in the first instance on whether the District Court's pre-trial order 
requiring disclosure of the "opinions and conclusions" of plaintiffs' experts provided sufficient 
notice to alert plaintiffs that the "admissibility'' of their experts' opinions and conclusions would be 
weighed at the time of the disclosure, so as to require the plaintiffs to disclose foundational facts to 
support their experts' testimony by the initial disclosure deadline. At a minimum, the pre-trial order 
14 EIRMC takes exception to the timing of the discovery by plaintiffs seeking EIRMC' s internal written policies, 
blaming plaintiffs for not asking for the information earlier. This argument is without merit. It is undisputed that the 
discovery requests were made and answers/responses were provided well within the discovery cutoff dates established 
by the District Court's pre-trial order. Rule 26(e)(l)(B) specifically contemplates supplementation under these 
circumstances. Throughout EIRMC's brief, it consistently accuses plaintiffs of delay and dilatory conduct. However, 
EIRMC has no knowledge of what was being done by plaintiffs' counsel during the course of this litigation. To suggest 
that plaintiffs' counsel was 'doing nothing' is pure speculation, misguided, and unprofessional. 
15The defendants seek to divert the Court's attention by alleging a failure by plaintiffs to fully respond to 
defendants' discovery. That issue was not raised below. Had this been a discovery issue, a meet and confer letter and 
a Motion to Compel would have been appropriate and necessary before seeking any sanctions. Defendants pursued 
neither. 
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was ambiguous and unclear in this regard. On December 5, 2013 the District Court agreed with the 
plaintiffs, holding that the pre-trial order was not specific with respect to the scope of disclosures 
anticipated by the District Court. After properly weighing the potential prejudice to the defendants 
against the policy of allowing cases to be adjudicated on their merits, the District Court properly 
extended additional time to plaintiffs to comply with the District Judge's expert disclosure 
expectations. Plaintiffs complied. Thereafter, on January 14, 2014 and without making findings or 
articulating any prejudice to defendants, and without explanation as to why lesser sanctions were 
not adequate, the District Court reversed itself, revoked the prior extension of additional time to 
plaintiffs to supplement their expert disclosures, and effectively entered a dismissal of plaintiffs' case 
by excluding plaintiffs experts. 
Because the District Court failed to make any specific findings of why lesser sanctions 
would not be sufficient to ameliorate any prejudice to defendants, and also failed to abide by the 
sanctions it had already imposed, its January 14, 2014 Order recanting its Order allowing an 
extension to plaintiffs to disclose the foundational facts to make their opinions "admissible" was an 
abuse of discretion. 
After the plaintiffs filed their expert witness disclosures in good faith and in conformity 
with their understanding, this case spiraled into confusion and disarray due to the District Court's 
inconsistent "back and forth" orders concerning its unarticulated expectations with respect to expert 
witness disclosures. The December 5, 2013 Order seemed to settle any dispute, only to be 
subsequently vacated without meaningful explanation or findings. 
Why the District Court invited additional briefing, filing of affidavits and the attendant 
procedural safeguards of a summary judgment proceeding, only to thereafter hold that it would not 
consider any information disclosed by plaintiffs after the initial disclosure date, remains a mystery, 
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and was error. The District Court should have considered the plaintiffs' supplemental affidavits as 
part of the summary judgment proceeding, or at a minimum, considered them on plaintiffs' 
subsequent request for reconsideration. 16 
Because I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B) specifically contemplates supplementation of expert 
opinions during the discovery process, it was error for the District Court to simply ignore the 
supplemental disclosures of Nurse Arruda when she provided with additional information from 
EIRMC through discovery which supported her opinions and conclusion, and which provided an 
independent foundation for her testimony. 
The District Court has abused its discretion and dismissed plaintiffs' claims because of 
a relatively minor procedural technicality, which could have been (and was, initially) remedied 
through clarification by the District Court. 17 If the District Court believed sanctions to be necessary, 
lesser sanctions were more appropriate than dismissal. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 ( a) instructs 
that the civil rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding." Unfortunately, in this case, the rules were not 
"liberally construed" and plaintiffs have been denied the ability to have their claim adjudicated on 
its merits as a result of the District Court's abuses. 
Plaintiffs request that this Court reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of defendants, reinstate plaintiffs' claims against both Dr. Marano and EIRMC, and remand 
this case for further proceedings. 
16 SeePuckettv. Verska, 114Idaho 161, 158P.3d937(2007). 
17 Plaintiffs continue their contention that the October 30, 2013 disclosures met the pre-trial order requirements. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 2014. 
NALDER LAW OFFICE, P.C. 
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